From Conflicts to Compatibility:The Incentives of Local Governments under Multi-Task Principal-Agency Relationship
High-quality development requires local governments to pursue balanced and sustainable development across economic,political,social,cultural,and environmental fields.However,when faced with multiple objectives,local governments may adopt strategic choices.Based on the multi-task principal-agent theory,three types of local government incentives can be constructed from the dimensions of"marginal return rate difference"and"task relationship":"incentive distortion","incentive weakening",and"incentive alignment".After the inclusion of environmental protection projects in local government performance evaluations in 2005,the interaction between the central government's policy adjustments and changes in local government behaviors,demonstrates that merely increasing the assessment intensity of neglected tasks is insufficient to the achievement of the desired outcomes.Only by transforming the relationship between tasks to achieve incentive alignment across tasks can high-quality development be effectively promoted at the local level.
conflicting tasksmulti-task principal agencyincentive distortionlocal government behavior
万方数据
维普
