From prosecutorial leadership to court leadership:the ideal model for corporate compliance reform
The criminal incentives for corporate compliance reform at the judicial level include the procuratorate's compliance with non-prosecution in the early stage and the court's active participation in compliance with sen-tencing leniency in the later stage.At this stage,the theoretical research and the practical exploration focus more on the former,while paying less attention to the latter.In current practice,the use of compliance with non-prose-cution has problems such as limited scope of application,overstepping of prosecutorial powers to seek punishment and insufficient legitimacy,which limit the effectiveness of compliance reform.Expanding the scope of reform and promoting the establishment of a criminal incentive system in the trial process is the essence of the trial-cen-tered litigation system reform.The ideal compliance reform model is to conduct an interpretative analysis from the four dimensions of subject,system,evidence and time limit of trials,clarify the leading and refereeing status of the court,establish a lenient sentencing incentive system for compliance,grant legal evidence qualifications to compli-ance materials,optimize the management of time limit of trials,establish the"four beams and eight pillars"for courts to participate in reform,and solve application obstacles such as no legal basis and no rules to follow,so as to better respond to practical challenges.
compliance of enterprise involved in the casecourt's participationcompliance sentencing incen-tivesevidencetime limit of trials
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