家族董事配置对家族企业投资效率的影响
Effect of family director allocation on the investment efficiency of family enterprises
闫鑫 1范宝学1
作者信息
- 1. 辽宁工程技术大学 工商管理学院,辽宁 葫芦岛 125105
- 折叠
摘要
针对家族董事配置对家族企业投资效率的影响问题,采用实证研究的方法,以2014-2021年A股上市家族企业为研究样本,分析董事会家族成员配置对企业投资效率的影响.研究表明:家族董事超额配置程度越高,企业非效率投资越少,企业投资效率越高.家族董事配置不足程度对企业投资效率没有显著影响.两权分离程度越高,家族董事超额配置越能够减少企业非效率投资,从而提升企业投资效率;家族董事配置不足不会显著影响企业投资效率.研究结论为加强家族企业管理,提高家族企业投资效率提供参考.
Abstract
In response to the issue of the impact of family director allocation on the investment efficiency of family businesses,an empirical research method is adopted,using family businesses listed on the A-share market from 2014 to 2021 as research samples,to analyze the impact of board member allocation on the investment efficiency of enterprises.Research has shown that the higher the degree of excessive allocation of family directors,the less inefficient investment the enterprise has,and the higher the investment efficiency of the enterprise.The degree of excessive allocation of family directors,the less significant the impact on the investment efficiency of the enterprise.The higher the degree of separation between the two powers,the more excess allocation of family directors can reduce inefficient investment of enterprises,thereby improving the investment efficiency of the enterprise;Insufficient allocation of family directors will not significantly affect of enterprises investment efficiency.The research conclusion provides reference for strengthening family business management and improving investment efficiency of family businesses.
关键词
家族企业/家族董事配置/投资效率/两权分离Key words
family enterprises/family director allocation/investment efficiency/separation of two rights引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
万方数据