Three-party evolutionary game analysis of power battery cascade utilization closed-loop supply chain under government supervision
Based on the two scenarios of cascade utilization of power battery and the implementation of reward and punishment mechanism by the government,a tripartite evolutionary game model of"manufacturer-cascade utilization enterprise-government regulatory department"is constructed,and based on the evolutionary game theory,the evolutionary stability strategy of the tripartite game system under different conditions is analyzed,and the influence of various factors on the choice of tripartite strategy is discussed.Numerical simulation is used to verify the influence of different parameters on the process and result of evolutionary game.The results show that mutually beneficial cooperation between enterprises and reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government are conducive to improving the level of industrial resource recycling;The government should strengthen the supervision of the market while giving full play to the effectiveness of the reward and punishment mechanism,so as to ensure the steady improvement of the cascade utilization level.
万方数据
维普
