Multi agent participation in the evolution game of green technology innovation of coal-power enterprises based on symbiosis theory
Aiming at the problem of green technology innovation of coal-power enterprises in improving enterprise efficiency,based on the symbiosis theory,the method of constructing a tri-partite evolutionary game model of the government,coal enterprises and power enterprises is adopted to analyze the influencing factors and the evolutionary trend of strategic selection of the game subjects'collaborative green technology innovation.Research shows that:the government's increase in subsidy intensity can promote the strengthening of the cooperation willingness of coal-power enterprises.When the subsidy intensity is too high,the government's financial pressure is too great and the system cannot reach a stable state.Under government regulation,coal-power enterprises should establish a liability system for breach of contract,which is supervised by the government to eliminate speculative behavior during the cooperation process.The increase in the loan interest rate of financial institutions can enhance the cooperation willingness of coal-power enterprises,relieve the government's financial pressure and maintain the stability of the green technology innovation system at the same time.The research conclusion provides a reference for promoting the construction of a multilevel-linked green technology innovation system for coal-power.
coal power enterprisesindustrial chainsymbiosis theorygreen technology innovationtri-partite evolutionary game
万方数据
