Has the M&A System Mitigated Stock Mispricing?—A Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on the Fourth Revision of Administrative Measures for the Acquisition of Listed Companies
This study selects A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2022 as samples,and uses Administrative Measures for the Acquisition of Listed Companies revised by CSRC as a quasi-natural experiment.It adopts the difference-in-differences(DID)model to test the impact of the implementation of the new revision of Measures for Acquisition in 2014 on stock mispricing.It finds that the implementation of this method can effectively mitigate stock mispricing.Mechanism testing shows that this method can mitigate stock mispricing through the ways of improving the information transparency and the governance level of companies.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the effect of the implementation of this method on stock mispricing is more remarkable in the context of negative compliance by the strategy committee and weak industry competition.This study provides theoretical basis and empirical evidence for the high-quality development of Chinese enterprises and the revision of supervision system of securities,and also contributes to the steady development of financial market and the improvement of pricing efficiency in capital market.