Game Analysis of Incentive Mechanism of"Government,Bank and Insurance"for Carbon Sinks Development under the Time Preference
⑴Background——The development and management of forestry carbon sinks projects is an important practice to implement China's ecological civilization construction.However,forestry carbon sinks projects have some problems,such as high development cost,frequent risks and insufficient financial support.How to stimu-late the enthusiasm of forestry enterprises to implement forestry carbon sinks projects to ensure the sustainability and stability of forestry carbon sinks production and management is a key issue to be solved urgently.⑵ Methods——This paper introduced the time preference of forest enterprises,designed the linkage in-centive mechanism of"forestry carbon sinks pledged credit+forestry carbon sinks price index insurance"under multiple government subsidies,and used the evolutionary game theory to explore the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism.⑶ Results——First,when the government subsidies to the insurance companies are lower than the operat-ing cost of the insurance,the evolutionary stable strategy is"no implementation,no provision,no operation".Second,when the banks'income from forestry carbon sinks pledge is less than its income from no such pledge,the evolutionary stable strategy is"no implementation,no provision,operation".Third,when the income of the forestry enterprises implementing carbon sinks projects is greater than the additional cost,the income of the banks providing credit is higher than its cost,and the operating cost of insurance companies is greater than its in-come,the evolutionary stable strategy is"implementation,provision,no operation".Fourth,when the sum of the income and insurance indemnity of the forestry enterprises implementing carbon sinks projects is greater than the sum of the additional cost and premium,the income of the banks providing credit is higher than its cost,and the operating cost of the insurance companies is less than its income,the evolutionary stable strategy is"imple-mentation,provision,operation".⑷ Conclusions and Discussions——First,the time preference of forestry enterprises has an inhibitory effect on the production and operation of carbon sinks projects.Second,with the increase of the government's cost subsidies for carbon sinks projects and the operational subsidies for insurance companies,the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism will be improved.Third,when the bank pledge rate is higher than a certain threshold,the increase of the rate has a positive effect on carbon sinks production.Increasing the overdue penalty will increase the banks'enthusiasm to provide credit,while increasing the reward for keeping the contracts will reduce the banks'enthusiasm.Fourth,the change of insurance premium rate and insurance compensation ratio will not affect the equilibrium state of the system,and choosing a moderate insurance premium rate and compensation ratio can improve the participation of financial institutions in the carbon sinks market.The following policy suggestions are put forward:First,improve the production conditions of carbon sinks and perfect the trading system of carbon sinks.Second,optimize the allocation of government financial resources and improve the efficiency of government support.Third,the commercial banks should implement diversified green innovation and guide more social funds into the field of forestry carbon sinks.Fourth,adopt dynamic pricing and simplified claims to strengthen the role of new insurance products.
forestry carbon sinkstime preferencepledged creditindex insuranceevolutionary game
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