碳税与碳交易机制下基于演化博弈模型的钢铁企业碳减排投资决策分析
Analysis of carbon emission reduction investment decision of steel enterprises based on evolutionary game model under carbon tax and carbon trading mechanism
玄婉玥 1朱昱承 2丁日佳 1翟建桥 2王科2
作者信息
- 1. 中国矿业大学(北京)管理学院,北京 100083
- 2. 北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京 100081
- 折叠
摘要
碳税和碳交易作为政府调控碳减排目标的主要措施之一,会对钢铁企业的碳减排投资决策产生重要影响.构建钢铁企业碳减排投资决策的演化博弈模型,并分别探讨在碳税和碳交易机制下企业碳减排投资策略.结果表明,碳减排投资的效率和成本以及搭便车收益对于钢铁企业的策略选择有重要影响;碳税和碳交易机制均能通过碳定价的方式降低搭便车行为的概率,促进钢铁企业协同减排,但二者对于企业收益的影响存在差别.
Abstract
Carbon taxation and carbon trading,as the government's primary measures to regulate carbon emission targets,will also significantly influence the carbon emission investment decisions of steel enterprises.This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for the carbon emission investment decisions of steel enterprises and explores the investment strategies for carbon emission reduction by enterprises under carbon taxation and carbon trading mechanisms.The results indicate that the efficiency and cost of carbon emission reduction investment,as well as free-rider benefits,significantly influence the strategic choices of steel enterprises.Both carbon taxation and carbon trading can reduce the probability of free-riding through carbon pricing,promoting coordinated emissions reduction by steel enterprises,but their effects on corporate profits differ.
关键词
钢铁企业/碳减排投资/演化博弈/碳交易/碳税Key words
steel industry/carbon emission reduction investment/evolutionary game/carbon trading/carbon tax引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据