Common Ownership and Stability of the Stock Market of China:Coordination in Governance or Collusion in Market
With the rapid development of China's capital market,the economic phenomenon of insti-tutional investors holding stakes in multiple companies within the same industry,referred to as"common institutional ownership",has become increasingly prevalent.This paper investigates how common institu-tional ownership affects stock market stability from the perspective of stock price crash risk.Our findings reveal that common institutional ownership increases the future stock price crash risk significantly,thus supporting the hypothesis of"collusion in market".Heterogeneous effects show that industrial capital and poor information environment strengthen the influence of common ownership on stock price crash risk.Mechanism of action inspection indicates that common institutional ownership decreases the disclosures of negative annual report tone.Additionally,the implementation of the Anti-Trust Law of the People's Repub-lic of China significantly suppresses the influence of common institutional ownership on stock price crash risk,which verifies the mechanism of bad news hiding under the motive of collusion monopoly.
common institutional ownershipcapital market stabilizationcollusion in marketstock price crash risk
万方数据
维普
