基于斯塔克尔伯格博弈的绿色供应链诚信策略演化博弈及仿真分析
Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Green Supply Chain Integrity Strategy Based on Stackelberg Game
沈俊辉 1张良成2
作者信息
- 1. 南昌航空大学 经济管理学院,南昌 330063
- 2. 南昌航空大学 马克思主义学院,南昌 330063;南京航空航天大学 马克思主义学院,南京 213300
- 折叠
摘要
加快企业绿色转型对我国实现双碳目标具有重要意义.为解决绿色供应链发展过程中出现的非法排放、虚假宣传、监管不力等问题,运用Stackelberg博弈、演化博弈和系统动力学模型,探寻绿色供应链参与主体的决策演化和系统稳定策略,以及各要素对绿色供应链系统演化的影响.研究表明:价格敏感系数与绿色营销敏感系数对主体决策演化的影响取决于两者之间的比例;制造商的诚实决策选择与其偷排程度有关,偷排程度较低的制造商倾向于诚实行为;高监督成本和高物质奖励都会导致政府监督的积极性降低;采用动态惩罚措施能够有效抑制系统的波动状态,并让制造商诚实概率和政府监督概率维持在合理水平.
Abstract
Accelerating the green transformation of enterprises is of great significance to China's realization of the dual-carbon goal.In order to solve the issues of illegal emissions,false advertising,and weak oversight that have emerged in the development of the green supply chain,Stackelberg games,evolutionary games,and system dynamics models are used to explores the decision-making evolution of the participating entities in the green supply chain and the strategies for system stability,as well as the impact of various factors on the evolution of the green supply chain system.The research reveals that the impact of price sensitivity and green marketing sensitivity on the evolution of entity decisions depends on their ratio;manufacturers'honest decision-making choices are related to their degree of illegal emissions,with lower levels of illegal emissions tending towards honest behavior;both high supervision costs and high material rewards can reduce the enthusiasm of government oversight;dynamic punishment measures can effectively suppress system volatility and maintain reasonable levels of manufacturer honesty and government oversight probabilities.
关键词
绿色供应链/碳排放/企业诚信/动态惩罚/演化博弈Key words
green supply chain/carbon emission/enterprise integrity/dynamic punishment/evolutionary game引用本文复制引用
基金项目
2022年南昌航空大学研究生创新专项资金项目(YC2022-123)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据