Optimal Contract Design of Power Grid Agency Power Purchase Based on Double-Layer Principal-Agent
In order to effectively transmit the cost of primary energy,all industrial and commercial users have now entered the power market.The users who do not meet the requirements for direct market transactions are represented by the power grid agency to purchase electricity and participate in the market,gradually narrowing the scope of the power grid agency purchasing.To meet the current market demand,it is necessary to design the optimal contract for purchasing power through the power gird agency,consider-ing the decision of users to choose power market agency and incentivizing users to authorize power sales companies to participate in the market.According to the principal-agent theory,the optimal contract of the power grid agency is proposed based on the double-layer principal-agent.The upper level is grid-user principal-agent model,which describes the optimal contract design of the power grid under the objective function of maximizing the users′ income.The lower level is user-retailer principal-agent model,which describes the game behavior of users authorizing power sales companies to participate in the market,which is used as the users'incen-tive constraint of the upper model.Finally,the usability of the proposed model is verified through a numerical example.Based on the analysis of the impact on model parameters and optimization results,suggestions of model parameter calculation and different power grid agency purchase contracts based on users profiling application are proposed.
power grid agency power purchasepower spot marketprincipal-agent theorypower userspower sales companies
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
万方数据
维普
