Dynamic Analysis of Dynamic Tax Subsidy Policy on the Promotion of New Energy Vehicles—Two-party Evolutionary Game Model Based on Government and Consumer
The development of fuel-efficient new energy vehicles is an effective means to implement the goal of"double carbon"construction.As the main body of new energy automobile consumption,consumers play a vital role in the process of promoting new energy automobile.In order to discuss the role of tax and subsidy policies on promoting new energy vehicles more effectively,based on the background of tax and subsidy reductions for new energy vehicles,this paper builds the two-party evolutionary game model based on government and consumer considering the dynamic tax and subsidy policies.According to the stability analysis and simulation experiment,the evolution of static tax and static subsidy policy can not reach the equilibrium point automatically,and there is no evolutionary stabilization strategy.When introducing dynamic tax and static subsidy,static tax and dynamic subsidy,dynamic tax and dynamic subsidy,evolution can be balanced.Through the simulation analysis of the comparison of the three dynamic support policies,we can find that the combination of static tax and dynamic subsidy policy is the best,which promotes the new energy vehicles more effectively.In the reality that subsidies for new energy vehicles are declining,this research conclusion has important practical significance and provides important reference for the government to adjust its promotion policies.At the same time,the research method of simulation experiment provides more possibilities for exploring the effects of different policy variability.
Evolutionary Game ModelReplication Dynamics AnalysisSimulationTax and SubsidyNew Energy Vehicles
万方数据
