The Impact of Government-Involved Green Credit on Corporate Carbon Emission Reduction——A three-party evolutionary game analysis of government,banks,and enterprises
Green finance,with green credit at its core,serves as a crucial force in promoting green development and achieving the"carbon peaking and carbon neutrality"goals in China.The article introduces constraints and incentives from local governments,constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving"government-bank-enterprise"to explore the impact of government-involved green credit on corporate carbon reduction.The research reveals that currently,resource-based enterprises in China lack an evolution-ary equilibrium strategy in the green transformation,leading to phenomena such as passive government supervision,collusion between banks and enterprises,and frequent instances of"green-washing"by companies.Government subsidy policies significantly promote green credit in banks,but the subsidy coefficients need careful calibration to maintain market stimulation and avoid government losses.The cost of bank green credit plays a crucial role in its strategic choices,with commercial banks actively participating in green credit only when it is profitable.In the banking sector,the potential risks associated with expanding credit pose significant concerns,and banks tend to be reluctant to bear substantial lending risks due to the need for additional resources.Based on these findings,it is rec-ommended that the government take a series of measures,including clarifying policies,establishing special funds,creating an evalua-tion system,setting appropriate subsidy coefficients,adopting phased adjustments,and establishing a risk-sharing mechanism to pro-mote the formation of a green credit system.Meanwhile,banks can reduce the operational costs of green credit through technological in-novation,risk management,and industry collaboration.
green creditbanking financial institutionscorporate emission reductionevolutionary game
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