南大法学2024,Issue(4) :90-103.

检讨评价性一般法理学

Evaluative General Jurisprudence Revisted

钱一栋
南大法学2024,Issue(4) :90-103.

检讨评价性一般法理学

Evaluative General Jurisprudence Revisted

钱一栋1
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作者信息

  • 1. 同济大学法学院
  • 折叠

摘要

一般法理学有描述性和评价性两种做法.评价性一般法理学的最佳版本由菲尼斯提出.一些批评者基于认知价值和道德价值的区分,认为诉诸认知价值便能完成对法律的说明,菲尼斯的道德化方案是错误的.这一批评陷入了稻草人谬误,忽视了菲尼斯对一般法理学的关注.但菲尼斯的方案并非无懈可击.它的两大前提——法理学要追求一般性;只有诉诸道德评价才能实现一般性——都存在严重问题.

Abstract

There are two approaches to general jurisprudence,descriptive and evaluative.The best version of evaluative general jurisprudence is presented by Finnis.Some critics,based on the distinction between epistemic and moral values,have argued that appealing to epistemic values can complete the account of the law,and that Finnis's moralising scheme is wrong.This criticism falls into the straw man fallacy and ignores Finnis's focus on general jurisprudence.But Finnis's scheme does have problems.Its two main premises,that jurisprudence should seek generality and that recourse to moral evaluation can achieve generality,are both seriously problematic.

关键词

评价性/一般法理学/菲尼斯

Key words

Evaluative/General Jurisprudence/Finnis

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基金项目

教育部人文社会科学研究项目(20YJC810009)

出版年

2024
南大法学

南大法学

CHSSCD
ISSN:2096-8434
参考文献量1
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