Promotion Incentives,Resource Mismatch,and High-Quality Economic Development:Based on the Perspective of Differentiation between Old and New Appraisal Models
Based on the characteristics of the"promotion tournament"governance model,this paper uses panel data from 287 cities at the prefecture level and above from 2003 to 2016 to empirically examine the differential impact of promotion incentives on high-quality economic development under the old and new models of assessment.The results show that under the traditional assessment,promotion incentives significantly hinder high-quality economic development,with resource misallocation being an important reason for this obstruction.The negative impact is more pronounced in cities with low resource abundance,low levels of government fiscal transparency,young leadership,and municipalities directly under the central government.Additionally,promotion incentives exhibit a"visibility bias"in performance.Under the new assessment perspective,promotion incentives alleviate the problem of resource misallocation,promote high-quality economic development in cities,and display characteristics of differentiated spatial spillover.
promotion incentiveshigh-quality economic developmentresource misallocationold and new assessment models
万方数据
