摘要
本文以 2007-2019 年中国沪深两市A 股上市公司为样本,考察了真实盈余管理与管理层诚信承诺之间的关系.实证结果表明,管理层在进行真实盈余管理之后,更倾向于在公司年报 MD&A中做出诚信承诺,证实管理层在负性道德情绪之后会作出道德掩饰行为;当管理层与投资者之间的信息不对称程度较高时,真实盈余管理与管理层诚信承诺之间的正相关关系更显著,说明信息不对称程度的提高会增强管理层在负性道德情绪之后的道德掩饰行为.进一步研究发现,管理层在真实盈余管理之后并未显著提升公司下一期的慈善捐赠与社会责任履行水平和降低公司下一期的真实盈余管理程度及代理成本,而管理层在真实盈余管理之后作出诚信承诺并不会影响分析师对公司未来市场估值的判断,亦不能降低公司未来被监管问询的概率,且不会影响公司未来财务业绩、违规与否或诉讼风险.研究还发现,当管理层面临较高的道德压力时,真实盈余管理与管理层诚信承诺之间的正相关关系更显著.本研究对学者们从负性道德情绪的角度研究高管行为具有理论启示意义,亦为投资者审慎投资、审计师提高审计质量及监管者进行有效监管提供了参考.
Abstract
There are cover-up behaviors of management after earnings management,such as increasing the complexity of textual in-formation,assisting the corresponding tone of textual information,etc.,in order to reduce the likelihood of the discovery of earnings management behaviors and improve the credibility of earnings information.However,the existing studies are mainly based on the as-sumptions that earnings management affects the company's future market valuation or the probability of being subjected to regulatory inquiries and so on,and few studies have considered the possibility that earnings management can generate psychological pressure on management from an ethical point of view.Based on the"Macbeth effect"hypothesis in psychological research,this paper empirically examines whether management will make a commitment to integrity in the MD&A of the company's annual report after real earnings management,using the samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2019.The empirical results show that,after the real earnings management,the management is more inclined to make the commitment to integrity in MD&A of the annual report,confirming that after the negative moral emotions,management will make moral cover-up behaviors.In addition,when the degree of information asymmetry between management and investors is high,the positive correlation between real earnings management and management integrity commitment is more significant,indicating that the improvement of the degree of information asymmetry will strengthen the moral cover-up behaviors after negative moral emotions.It is further found that,on the one hand,management does not signifi-cantly increase the level of charitable donations and the level of CSR fulfillment in the next period after real earnings management,and the degree of real earnings management and agency costs in the next period are still significantly higher,which further suggests that management is more inclined to make moral cover-up behaviors rather than moral clean behaviors after negative moral emotions,on the other hand,management integrity commitment after real earnings management does not affect analysts'judgment of the com-pany's future market valuation,reduce the probability of the company's future regulatory inquiries,and affect the company's future financial performance,being or not being in violation of the law or the risk of litigation.Further research also finds that the positive correlation between real earnings management and management integrity commitment is more significant when management faces higher moral pressure.Compared with the previous literature,this paper contributes to the following two aspects.(1)This paper enriches the research on the economic consequences of real earnings management by studying management's behavioral tendency after real earnings management from the perspective of management as the actor rather than firms as the subject of implementation.(2)For the management to engage in the manipulation of textual information,this paper reveals that there are reasons other than affecting the company's future market valuation,reducing the probability of the company's future regulatory inquiries and affecting the company's financial performance,being or not being in violation of the law or the risk of litigation,expanding the scope of cross-study between management and psy-chology.This paper helps auditors to have a preliminary understanding of the integrity of management based on the information in the MD&A of the company's annual report,which in turn prompts them to be more prudent in the assessment of the risk,the development of the audit plan and other aspects of the audit,and ultimately improves the quality of the audit.At the same time,it can play a certain aux-iliary role for investors in the capital market to make investment decisions,and it helps the regulatory authorities to effectively super-vise the negative moral behaviors of listed companies.
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