首页|劳动力保护、研发要素结构配置与企业创新——基于《社会保险法》准自然实验的检验

劳动力保护、研发要素结构配置与企业创新——基于《社会保险法》准自然实验的检验

扫码查看
本文基于 2007-2015 年中关村海淀科技园企业数据集,将 2011 年颁布实施的《社会保险法》作为一项准自然实验,实证研究了劳动力保护影响企业创新的效应与机制.研究发现,《社会保险法》的实施会通过创新激励效应倒逼企业创新水平不断提升.在经过替换被解释变量、平行趋势检验等一系列稳健性检验后,该结论仍然成立.机制研究表明,考虑到创新行为的不可逆和不确定性特征,劳动力成本上升会推动企业调整研发要素的结构配置,在创新资本投入方面,企业更多增加对产学研的创新投入,不仅有利于企业控制研发失败的风险,更有利于企业在研发过程中借助科研机构扬长避短,进而提升企业创新.同时,出于降成本、控风险的考虑,企业也会主动减少自主式研发创新投入.进一步的异质性分析发现,《社会保险法》的实施对融资能力较强、水平治理能力较高、企业家认知能力较强和大中型企业的创新激励效应更强.在劳动保护日益加强的背景下,本文为劳动力保护能通过倒逼式促进企业高质量创新发展提供了经验证据.
Labor Force Protection,R&D Element Structure Allo-cation and Enterprise Innovation:Test of Quasi-natural Experiment Based on Social Insurance Law
As China's economy enters a new stage of develop-ment,innovation has become the primary internal driving force for high-quality economic growth.Unlike general production activities,the innovation process itself is a process of creative destruction.If innovation fails,companies may have to pay a significant amount of sunk costs,characterized by irreversibility and uncertainty.To address the uncertainty risks in corporate innovation,countries generally adopt two policy tools:tax incentives and fiscal subsidies,aiming to alleviate the financial constraints in corporate innovation and strengthen companies'positive expectations for innovative be-havior.However,these policy tools also have moral hazard issues,meaning that companies may not undertake innovative actions while enjoying preferential policies.Therefore,in the process of promoting corporate innovation,effectively safeguarding the legit-imate rights and interests of workers is fundamental to advancing high-quality innovation and enhancing the effectiveness of prefer-ential policies.The main research content of this paper includes four aspects:benchmark regression results,robustness checks,mechanism anal-ysis,and heterogeneity analysis.Specifically,this paper is based on the enterprise data set from Zhongguancun Haidian Science Park for the years 2007 to 2015,and takes the"Social Insurance Law"implemented in 2011 as a quasi-natural experiment to empirically study the impact and mechanism of labor protection on corporate innovation effects.The study finds that the implementation of the"Social Insurance Law"will continuously push up the level of cor-porate innovation through an innovation incentive effect.After a series of robustness checks such as replacing the explained variable and parallel trend tests,the conclusion still holds.Mechanism research indicates that considering the irreversible and uncertain characteristics of innovative behavior,the increase in labor costs will drive enterprises to adjust the structural allocation of R&D el-ements.In terms of innovation capital investment,companies tend to increase their investment in industry-university-research coop-eration,which is not only conducive to controlling the risk of R&D failure but also more importantly,helps enterprises to leverage the strengths and avoid the weaknesses of research institutions during the R&D process,thereby enhancing corporate innovation.At the same time,considering the reduction of costs and control of risks,companies will also actively reduce their independent R&D innova-tion investment.Further analysis of heterogeneous effects reveals that the implementation of the"Social Insurance Law"has a stron-ger innovation incentive effect on enterprises with strong financing capabilities,higher governance levels,strong entrepreneurial cog-nitive abilities,and medium to large enterprises.Against the back-drop of increasing labor protection,this paper provides empirical evidence that labor protection can promote high-quality innovation and development of enterprises through a reverse-driven approach.This paper has significant theoretical value and practical signifi-cance,and its potential marginal innovations are reflected in the following three aspects:First,most current related studies primarily use data from listed companies as samples,lacking representation of small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs);the"Social In-surance Law"mainly targets SMEs that have tax avoidance and informal labor relations,while listed companies,as representatives of high-quality enterprises in China,may have sample bias issues in policy evaluation;Second,current research on the impact of labor protection on corporate innovation mainly focuses on the allocation of capital and labor elements,R&D investment,and the skill struc-ture of corporate employees,lacking direct mechanisms that affect corporate innovation.Moreover,although labor protection may lead to adjustments in the human capital of corporate employees,most of these adjustments may come from the labor force structure in the production process,not from the structural adjustment of the R&D and innovation team dedicated to the enterprise;Third,a large num-ber of studies generally follow the mechanism that increased R&D investment enhances corporate innovation,but they do not delve into the"black box"of R&D innovation.Therefore,this paper starts from the perspective of corporate adjustment of innovation elements,on the one hand,labor protection will accelerate the ad-justment of the corporate human capital structure,by increasing the input of high-skilled labor to introduce R&D personnel and highly educated talents needed for innovation activities,thereby promoting corporate innovation;on the other hand,it will promote the adjust-ment of corporate R&D strategies,adopting more investment in industry-university-research cooperation,and reducing independent innovation investment represented by R&D equipment investment,thus opening the"black box"of R&D innovation,constructing a more complete theoretical framework,and also providing an im-portant supplement to existing related research.

Labor ProtectionCorporate InnovationR&D Factor StructureIndustry-University-Research CollaborationIndepen-dent Innovation

李逸飞、孙康、李静

展开 >

管理世界杂志社

中央财经大学会计学院

对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院

劳动力保护 企业创新 研发要素结构 产学研 自主创新

国家社会科学基金项目教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目

21BJL11819YJC790061

2024

南开管理评论
南开大学国际商学院

南开管理评论

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:3.438
ISSN:1008-3448
年,卷(期):2024.27(4)
  • 26