首页|知识产权保护与中国企业的成本加成率——以市级专利代办处设立为例

知识产权保护与中国企业的成本加成率——以市级专利代办处设立为例

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本文基于异质性企业理论模型,探讨了知识产权保护增强影响企业成本加成率的微观机制.在此基础上,运用 1998-2015 年工业企业数据库,将市级层面专利代办处的设立作为拟自然实验,采用跨期双重差分方法,对理论假说进行了验证.实证表明,知识产权保护对企业的成本加成率有显著的正向影响,并且这一影响具有时间持续性.此外,知识产权保护的影响存在门槛效应,只有创新能力高于一定门槛的企业,方能在知识产权保护增强时提高成本加成率.机制分析表明,知识产权保护的"创新效应"和"竞争效应"会影响企业的成本加成率.知识产权保护增强可以提高创新能力,降低企业竞争程度,从而有利于我国企业的成本加成率提升.
Intellectual Property Protection and Chinese Firms' Markup:Evidence from the Establishment of Municipal Patent Agency
Based on the framework of heterogeneous firm theory model,this paper discusses the micro mechanism of the enhancement of intellectual property protection on firms'markup.Furthermore,using the data of Chinese industrial enterprise database from 1998 to 2015,this paper takes the establishment of municipal patent agency as a quasi-natural experiment and uses intertemporal difference-in-differences method to verify the conclusion of theoretical model.The results show that,the protection of intellectual property rights has a significant positive impact on the firms'markup,and this effect is time-lasting.In addition,the impact of intellectual prop-erty protection has a threshold effect.Only enterprises with innovation ability higher than a cer-tain threshold can increase the markup when intellectual property protection is enhanced.Mecha-nism analysis shows that the"innovation effect"and"competition effect"of intellectual property protection will affect the enterprises'markup.The enhancement of intellectual property protection can improve the innovation ability and reduce the degree of enterprise competition,which is conducive to the increase of Chinese enterprises'markup.

Intellectual Property ProtectionMarkupInnovation EffectCompetitive EffectThreshold Effect

卜文超、蒋殿春

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南开大学经济学院(邮编:300071)

格拉斯哥大学社会与政治科学学院(邮编:G128QQ)

南开大学经济行为与政策模拟实验室

南开大学跨国公司研究中心(邮编:300071)

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知识产权保护 成本加成率 创新效应 竞争效应 门槛效应

教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目教育部哲学社会科学实验室专项

22JJD790039H0122706

2024

南开经济研究
南开大学经济学院

南开经济研究

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.82
ISSN:1001-4691
年,卷(期):2024.(2)
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