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政府补贴下平台赋能中小企业数字化转型的演化策略研究

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已有研究关注到政府补贴、平台赋能可以弥补中小企业数字化转型在资源和能力上的不足,但三者间的互动关系及其相应的行为策略调整还有待深入研究.理顺三者间的协同演化关系,对于推动中小企业数字化转型、促进平台持续健康发展及提升政府补贴有效性具有重要意义.基于此,本文构建中小企业、平台和政府的三方演化博弈模型,运用Matlab2016 对不同因素影响下的三方协同策略进行仿真分析.结果表明,政府加大对中小企业、平台的补贴力度能够提升中小企业选择加入平台、平台选择优化服务的概率,但为了发挥市场主体作用及减轻财政负担等,随着补贴力度的增加,政府选择补贴的速率会降低;平台或中小企业的吸收能力小于临界值、平台赋能资源量大于临界值均不利于三方良性互动;平台承载中小企业的数量存在最低规模边界,低于边界值平台倾向选择一般服务;政府加大对平台的惩罚力度能够提升平台选择优化服务的概率.该研究结论有助于明晰政府补贴、平台赋能和中小企业数字化转型的内在逻辑关系,为中小企业、平台和政府的行为决策提供理论借鉴,以期促进平台赋能中小企业数字化转型.
Research on the Evolution Strategy of Platform Empowerment on SMES Digital Transformation under the Government Subsidies
Previous studies have paid attention to the fact that government subsidies and platform empowerment can make up for the lack of resources and capabilities of SMES(small and medium-sized enterprises)digital transformation,but the interaction among the three and its corresponding strategic adjustment need to be studied in depth.Straightening out the collaborative evolution rela-tionship among the three is of great significance to promote SMES digital transformation,promote the sustainable and healthy development of the platform,and improve the effectiveness of government subsidies.Based on this,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model in which SMES,platforms and government participate,and uses Matlab2016 to simulate and analyze the tripartite collaborative strategy under different situations.The results show that:increasing subsidies for SMES and platforms can increase the probability of SMES choosing to join the platform and platforms choosing to optimize services.However,in order to play the role of market players and alleviate the financial burden,the rate of government subsidies will de-crease as the intensity of subsidies increases;The absorption capacity of SMES and platform is less than the critical value,the amount of resources empowered by the platform is greater than the critical value,which is not conducive to the benign interaction of the three;There is a mini-mum scale boundary for the number of SMES carried by the platform,and the platform tends to choose general services below the boundary value;In addition,increasing the government's penalties for platforms can increase the probability that platforms choose to optimize services.The research conclusions help to clarify the internal logical relationship among government subsidies,platform empowerment and SMES digital transformation,and provide theoretical ref-erence for the behavior decision-making of SMES,platforms and governments,so as to promote SMES digital transformation of platform empowerment.

SMESPlatform EmpowermentGovernment SubsidiesEvolutionary Game

石建中、何梦茹

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中国海洋大学管理学院(邮编:266100)

中小企业 平台赋能 政府补贴 演化博弈

国家社科基金一般项目

22BJY253

2024

南开经济研究
南开大学经济学院

南开经济研究

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.82
ISSN:1001-4691
年,卷(期):2024.(7)