Evolution of Competition and Cooperation:Study on the Dynamic Equilibrium of Horizontal Organizations
Due to the neglect of horizontal organizational forms and the limitation to comparative static methods by the new institutional economics school in organizational research,and the lack of benefit performance standards and incentive mechanism evaluation,a principle model of the evolution of competition and cooperation has not yet been developed.This paper proposes a new principle model of dynamic equilibrium in horizontal organizations based on a binary organizational performance evaluation standard,using dynamic equilibrium analysis methods from the perspective of horizontal relationship differentiation.Through analysis of basic principles and mathematical mod-el demonstration,three research hypotheses are proposed:horizontal relationship differentiation is generally nega-tively correlated with equilibrium point of labor division gains,while positively correlated with equilibrium point transaction costs,and equilibrium point net income is negatively correlated with equilibrium point integration.Em-pirical tests on data samples from two industry enterprises support the three research hypotheses.The research con-clusions are as follows:First,horizontal organizations have dual economies.The first economy refers to scale effi-ciency and alignment difficulty under quantitative complementarity,and allocation efficiency and alignment difficul-ty under structural complementarity.The second economy refers to the degree of choosing incentive methods to a-chieve complementary efficiency and the degree of choosing alignment methods to control alignment difficulty.Sec-ond,when horizontal division of labor deepens and horizontal relationships differentiate,differentiated complemen-tarity and substitution increase,while homogeneous complementarity and substitution decrease.The types and sources of complementary efficiency increase,the complexity of the contract system and the tendency of opportunism strengthen.Complementary efficiency and corresponding labor division gains grow at a decelerating rate due to po-tential space constraints,while alignment difficulty and corresponding transaction costs grow at an accelerating rate due to factor superposition and interweaving.Under general circumstances,horizontal organizations tend towards in-tegration.Third,equilibrium point net income is negatively correlated with equilibrium point integration;general-ly,horizontal relationship differentiation is negatively correlated with equilibrium point of labor division gains and positively correlated with equilibrium point of transaction costs.Fourth,establish an organizational horizontal inte-gration indicator of"minority equity interests/owners'equity."It is recommended to seize opportunities for deepe-ning horizontal division of labor in competition and cooperation,optimize industrial policies,apply advanced tech-nologies and management reform measures,unlock complementary efficiency potential,suppress the growth of a-lignment difficulty,and promote profitability.
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