Evolutionary game on the compliant use of external water diversion and local water under government regulation and social supervision
The local water price of the South-to-North Water Transfers Project was comparatively higher in some receiving areas.Driven by economic interests,the water users tended to illegally over-exploit the scarce local water resources,leading to a series of ecological and environmental problems in these regions.It is necessary to study the regulatory mechanisms of water use behavior under the dual constraints of government regulation and public supervision in order to reduce the illegal water use behavior in receiving areas.The research took local governments,water users,and the public as three main participants.An evolutionary game model was established to explore the strategic choices of the participants under different scenarios.A system dynamics model was constructed for simulating the evolution of strategies in the three-party game system and the impact of key parameters on the behavior strategies of the participants.The results showed that:(1)government regulation is affected by the cost of regulation,but only when the cost of strict regulation is controlled within a specific acceptable range could the government be more active in adopting the strategy of strict regulation.(2)Increasing government water fee subsidies and penalties could encourage users to choose external water.Water users were more sensitive to government subsidies than to penalties.(3)Supervision cost was a crucial factor influencing public participation in supervision and reporting.High supervision costs would lead the public to abandon participation in supervision and reporting.It is concluded that the government played a guiding and constraining role in the water use behavior.It was necessary to establish reasonable and effective regulatory and punitive mechanisms to reduce illegal water use while providing appropriate water use subsidies to increase the willingness of water users to use external water.Additionally,as an essential supplement to the government's regulatory power,the public requires an incentive mechanism to enhance their participation in supervision and reporting.Relevant policy recommendations were proposed for reducing illegal water use behavior by improving government regulatory mechanisms and methods,perfecting effective punitive systems,and promoting public supervision.
government regulationsocial monitoringcompliant water usage behaviorevolutionary gamesystem dynamics
万方数据
维普
