Decision Analysis of Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Asymmetry Information under Uncertain Recyclables Quality
In a closed-loop supply chain with asymmetric information,a manufacturer-driven Stackelberg game model was constructed to explore how manufacturer risk aversion and recycled product quality affect pricing and benefits within the supply chain.The research shows that as manufacturer risk aversion increa-ses,the selling price,wholesale price,and utilities for both the manufacturer and retailer decrease,while the recycled product price goes up.Additionally,higher recycled product quality leads to an increase in re-cycled product price,transfer price,and utilities for the manufacturer and retailer.In cases where the re-tailer provides inaccurate reports on recycling costs,there is an improvement in recycled product price,transfer price,and retailer utility compared to honest reporting.When the recycled product quality is low and the manufacturer exhibits high levels of risk aversion,the manufacturer's utility is lower than under symmetrical information conditions.Hence,it is recommended that supply chain members focus on im-proving recycled product quality,and manufacturers should actively establish mechanisms for sharing in-formation within the supply chain,conduct thorough market research,and reduce risk aversion levels.
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