Analysis of evolutionary game regarding emergency sensemaking behavior
[Objective]Emergency sensemaking can control a situation by identifying the warning signs early and before the situation deteriorates further,However,the different benefit paths of multiagents in emergency sensemaking can easily lead to sensemaking failure and additional escalation of risk event losses.Therefore,it is vital to study how to influence the strategic choice of the relevant agents in sensemaking in the real world.[Methods]Based on the prospect theory-mental account,this report applied the evolutionary game model to study the following complex behavior mechanism among the multiagents in emergency sensemaking:the public(truthfully providing information or falsely providing information),frontline personnel(efficientlyreporting or inefficiently reporting),and emergency command(group wisdom or group myth).According to different strategic choices,the payoff matrix is constructed,and the evolutionary replication dynamic equation is obtained using the matrix;however,the three evolutionary replication dynamic equations cannot directly determine the equilibrium point of the tripartite strategy.In this study,the Jacobian matrix is obtained by partial derivation of the forward decision probability of three differential equations,and the stability of the strategy choice of each game agent is analyzed by calculating the eigenvalues of the matrix.In order to further analyze the influence of key elements on the evolution process and results of the game.The computer simulation software MATLAB was used to establish a game model and assign initial values to each parameter in the model.The key parameters affecting the evolution path of decision-making behavior are extracted and analyzed by adjusting the initial values of the parameters.[Results]Solving the game model provides the following findings:1)When the labor cost of frontline personnel is high,or the punishment is weak,the cost of the emergency command choosing a speculative strategy is substantially reduced.In this case,emergency sensemaking completely depends on the spontaneous behavior of the public,resulting in a lack of coordination efficiency and accurate judgment from frontline personnel and the emergency command.2)By increasing the reward subsidies for positive decision-making by frontline personnel and increasing the penalties for negative decision-making,the signs of emergencies can be better understood and constructed by multiagents,and the emergency command can respond more rapidly.3)When the perceived benefit of the emergency command to fully respond to the emergency is increased,the penalty of being tracked for choosing the speculative strategy is increased,and the system will stabilize at the optimal equilibrium point(1,1,1).4)Simulation studies of the game model reveal that by adjusting the initial probabilities of the agents'strategies,perceptual reference points,and the intensity of punishment,the agents'strategic choices gradually tend toward positive choices.The convergence speed improves substantially with the increase of these parameters.[Conclusions]The results of this study showed that the perception of benefits influences the initial probability of the agents'strategy choice,and the initial probability of the choice is the factor that affects the agents'positive strategy choice.While expanding the incentive policy to encourage the agents'positive sensemaking behavior,the supervision and reporting measures should be increased to neglect the public interest behavior,and the corresponding agent should be severely punished.In addition to the established reward and punishment measures,subjective factors significantly influence decision-making.In practice,excellent individuals should be commended,and public welfare campaigns should be organized to reduce the perceptual reference points of income,allowing the agents to understand the necessity of emergency sensemaking work and make positive decisions spontaneously.
emergencysensemakingprospect theorymental accountsevolutionary game
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