In the Explanatory Memorandum on the Resolution on the European Convention on Human Rights and National Constitutions,the Council of Europe accepted for the first time the concept of"multilevel constitutionalism".This paper profoundly analyses the meaning of"multilevel constitutionalism"in Europe,particu-larly the interrelationship among national constitutions,EU law and ECHR.In terms of their interrelationship,different domestic constitutional courts and supreme courts have taken different approaches to the ECHR,with some countries considering their constitutions to be superior to international human rights treaties.At the same time,ECHR has endeavored to uphold European Community law as embodied in the Con-vention.The paper points to the significance of complementarity between the domestic constitutional order and the ECHR and suggests ways to strengthen this complementar-ity through research into best practices and the development of institutional solutions to reduce friction.While the Council of Europe recognizes the tensions in the legal order in a multilevel constitutional system,any solution strategy must respect interna-tional legal obligations and preserve the authority and credibility of ECHR.The paper further explores potential conflicts between EU law and the ECHR and elaborates that these conflicts can be resolved peacefully through cases of judicial dialogue such as the Italian Taricco case.With the EU's accession to the ECHR,the question of how to deal with disagreements between CJEU and ECHR judgments has become critical,and it is suggested that domestic courts adopt a similar analytical approach to that of the ECHR in order to maintain consistency in the interpretation and application of the law.Furthermore,the paper discusses the relationship between international human rights treaties and the domestic legal order,particularly the challenges in enforcing ECHR judgments.In some cases,domestic constitutional courts may need to adapt domestic law,adopt interpretative techniques,or even consider constitutional amendments to accommodate the judgments of human rights courts.The reform of the Bill of Rights 1689 is presented as a case study,demonstrating how domestic implementation can be adapted while maintaining a commitment to the Convention,but also showing the risks that may be posed by reducing consideration of ECHR case law.Finally,the paper proposes to mitigate tensions between different legal orders and courts through judicial dialogue and innovative mechanisms,such as the creation of mixed chambers of CJEU with the participation of national judges.This will help to ensure that the European system of"multilevel constitutionalism"respects national constitutions and European human rights standards while promoting the rule of law,democratic principles,and the harmony between the sovereignty of Member States and their international obliga-tions,and contributing to the common advancement of the European legal order as a whole.
multilevel constitutionalismEuropean convention on human rights(ECHR)national constitutionsEuropean court of human rightsdialogue
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