CEO Equity Incentives,Financing Constraints,and Enterprise Investment Efficiency
The article selects annual data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2022 as the sample,and empirically studies the impact of CEO equity incentives on investment efficiency and the moderating effect of financing constraints between the two through theoretical analysis and the construction of panel data regression models.The results show that CEO equity incentives have a significant negative impact on corporate investment efficiency;mainly reflected in overinvestment;Financing constraints can to some extent alleviate the negative effects of both and improve the investment efficiency of enterprises.Further research has found that the decrease in investment efficiency brought about by CEO equity incentives occurs in the high attention group,male CEO group,and high level of enterprise risk-taking group.The research results contribute to enhancing the understanding of CEO equity incentives and investment efficiency in enterprises,and have important implications and practical value for promoting investment efficiency and promoting China's economic development.
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
