Mixed Ownership Rreform,Tax Incentives,and Leverage Ratio of State-Owned Enterprises
In the context of structural deleveraging,the leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises has always been a concern.The article uses data from state-owned enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2013 to 2021,and analyzes the relationship between mixed ownership reform and the leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises through a two-way fixed effects model,as well as the impact of tax incentives on the relationship between the two.Theoretical and empirical analysis results indicate that:firstly,there is a U-shaped relationship between the degree of mixed ownership reform and the leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises;Secondly,the turning point of the mixed ownership reform of long-term leverage ratio appears earlier than that of short-term leverage ratio;Thirdly,tax incentives can have a significant moderating effect on the U-shaped relationship between mixed ownership reform and the leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises,and high tax incentives will shift the U-shaped curve turning point to the left,making the curve smoother.This indicates that high tax incentives can alleviate the volatility of mixed ownership reform on the leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises.
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
