Four-party-collaborative regulatory strategy of network freight platform based on evolutionary game
To effectively regulate network freight platform,a four-party collaborative regulatory game model is constructed,involving national regulatory authorities,provincial regulatory authorities,network freight platform,and the general public.Through the calculation of the replicator dynamic equations of the four entities,16 pure strategy equilibrium points are derived,among which there are no absolute stable points,but 9 stable points under certain conditions.The stability conditions of these 9 stable points are analyzed,and the evolution paths of the strategies of the four parties are examined through numerical simulations under the ideal strategy combination(0,1,1,0)when regulatory system parameters change.The results show that coordination and interaction between different levels of government regulatory authorities can enhance the stability of the regulatory system.Increasing penalties from national regulatory authorities for passive regulation by provincial authorities and increasing rewards for active regulation can facilitate quicker achievement of stable strategy combinations between provincial authorities and network freight platform.Increasing rewards for compliant operations of network freight platform is more suitable as a short-term regulatory strategy.Strengthening penalties for non-compliant operations of network freight platform can quickly evolve them towards a stable compliant operation state,indicating that increasing penalties is a more effective regulatory approach for addressing non-compliance issues.Limiting the profits from non-compliant operations is a meaningful governance strategy,while increasing rewards for public reporting of non-compliant behavior by the network freight platform mainly improves public participation in regulation in the early stages.
万方数据
维普
