The Impact of Analysts on Managers'Accounting Choices:From the Perspective of Performance Compensation Commitment
Using A-share listed companies that have signed performance compensation commitment agree-ments from 2007 to 2020 as research samples,this paper studies the influence of analysts on manager'accounting choices related to goodwill impairment,taking the realization degree of underlying assets'performance compensa-tion commitment as an indication of goodwill impairment.It is found that when the number of analysts tracking listed companies increases,the proportion of performance compensation commitments of underlying assets will decrease,and managers will tend to make an accounting choice to provision for goodwill impairment,and the amount of good-will impairment will increase.In addition,for the samples of underlying asset performance compensation commit-ments that have not been realized but have not provided for goodwill impairment,analysts will"vote with their feet",and the number of analysts tracking in the next period will be reduced.This paper reveals that analysts exert influence on the accounting choice of managers of listed companies by supervising them beforehand and punishing them afterwards.Meanwhile,it also enriches the relevant literature about analysts as information intermediaries and influencing factors of goodwill impairment.
analystperformance compensation commitmentsigns of impairmentgoodwill impairmentac-counting choice
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