State-owned enterprises play an important role in China's economic development.In order to encourage executives of state-owned enterprises to better fulfill their responsibilities,improve enterprise performance,and ensure the sustainable development of enterprises,the government has implemented a"salary restriction order".The article takes 410 state-owned enterprises from 2010 to 2021 as research samples and uses the multiple regression model and the difference-in-differences model to empirically test the effects of executive monetary compensation,executive shareholding ratio,and on-the-job consumption on enterprise performance,and explore the impact of the"salary restriction order"on the relationship between compensation and enterprise performance.It has been found that executive monetary compensation and shareholding ratio have a positive promoting effect on enterprise performance,while executive on-the-job consumption has a negative impact on enterprise performance.Further research has found that the"salary restriction order"enhances the positive effect of executive compensation control on enterprise performance.This study has certain reference significance for a deeper understanding of the salary incentive mechanism.
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