Can Stable Institutional Investor Ownership Curb"Double-High Savings and Loans"of Enterprises?
In recent years,the phenomenon of"double-high savings and loans"in the capital market has received the attention of researchers and regulators due to the impact on the stability of the capital market caused by the sharp decline in the share prices of enterprises such as Kangdexin and Dongxu Photovoltaic.In order to investigate whether the shareholding of stable institutional investors can inhibit the problem of"double-high savings and loans",this paper selects the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2022,and empirically analyzes the relationship and the mechanism of the role of the two.The research results show that stable institutional investors'shareholding can significantly inhibit the problem of"double-high savings and loans".The mechanism analysis based on the intermediary effect model reveals that the real surplus management and the major shareholders'hollowing out have played an intermediary effect,and the stable institutional investors'shareholding can inhibit the"double-high savings and loans"problem by suppressing the real surplus management and the major shareholders'hollowing out.The mediating effect analysis finds that good internal and external governance mechanisms play a mediating role,and in enterprises with better corporate governance,higher quality of internal control and external audit,stable institutional investors'shareholding has a stronger inhibiting effect on the"double-high savings and loans".The findings of this paper provide a new way of thinking on how to curb the financial anomaly of"double-high savings and loans",and at the same time,this paper also reveals the positive effect of stable institutional investors on the stability of the capital market and corporate governance from a different perspective.
institutional investorsstable institutional investordouble-high savings and loans
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