Pricing Decisions and Strategy Selection under Advance Selling in a Competitive Market
In the era of the digital economy,the"new retail"strategy presents customers with an innova-tive shopping paradigm.In intense market competition,pricing strategies have emerged as a crucial deter-minant for e-commerce enterprises to achieve substantial revenue under advance selling.Given the uncer-tainty of consumer valuation and preferences,this research delves into the advance selling pricing in a du-opoly competitive market,considering the intricate interplay between the e-commerce enterprise,the com-petitor,and consumers.According to the expected utility theory,a consumer utility function is formula-ted,encapsulating advance selling utility and waiting utility.Then,a pre-sale pricing model is built for two oligopoly retailers in a competitive setting.Three symmetric Nash equilibria are discussed.The study finds that the full advance selling strategy is dominated by both no advance selling and insufficient advance selling strategies in the competitive market.When the proportion of high-valuation consumers is higher than the valuation stability coefficient,retailers do not offer advance selling in the competitive market.Otherwise,the strategy selection also depends on the degree of preference fluctuation.
万方数据
维普
