监督型基金持股会影响审计意见吗?
The Impacts of Motivated Fund Shareholding on Auditors'Opinion
宋云玲 1武浩 2宋衍蘅 3黄晓蓓4
作者信息
- 1. 内蒙古大学经济管理学院,010021
- 2. 西南财经大学会计学院,611130
- 3. 北京外国语大学国际商学院,100089
- 4. 北方工业大学经济管理学院,100124
- 折叠
摘要
公募基金作为资本市场的专业投资力量和普惠金融载体,能否发挥公司治理作用进而提高公司质量?本文以2004-2020年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,从审计意见视角,考察了监督型基金的治理作用.研究发现,监督型基金持股可显著降低非标审计意见概率和审计意见偏离度,表现出积极的"治本"效应.机制分析显示,监督型基金持股通过提升公司绩效、信息透明度和公司治理水平、降低经营风险等机制影响审计意见.异质性分析显示,监督型基金持股对审计意见的影响在更需要外部监管的样本中更加显著.研究结果为监管部门思考如何培育和发展高质量的专业投资力量和普惠金融载体提供了政策借鉴.
Abstract
Mutual funds serve as professional investment entities and inclusive financial instruments in capital markets.Do they play a role in corporate governance to improve corporate quality?Based on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2020,we investigate the governance role of motivated funds from the perspective of audit opinions.We find that shareholdings by motivated funds can significantly decrease the probability of auditors'qualified opinions and the deviation of auditors'opinion,exhibiting a positive effect of addressing the root causes.Mechanism analysis reveals that shareholdings by motivated funds affect audit opinions by enhancing corporate performance,promoting information transparency,improving the levels of corporate governance,and reducing operation risks.Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the effect of shareholdings by motivated funds on audit opinions is more profound in observations requiring more external regulation.The findings provide policy implications for regulators in fostering and promoting higher-quality professional investors and intermediaries of inclusive finance.
关键词
监督型基金/非标审计意见/审计意见偏离度/公司治理/信息透明度Key words
motivated fund/qualified opinion/deviation of auditors'opinion/corporate governance/information transparency引用本文复制引用
基金项目
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(22YJA630073)
国家自然科学基金(72072015)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项(2021JJ021)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据