Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government-Enterprise Interaction in Water Conservancy Project Supervision
The interaction between government and enterprise in the supervision of water conservancy project is a complex dynamic evolution process,and both sides have mutual influence in the interaction process.This paper uses evolutionary game theory to study the interaction between government and enterprise in the supervision of water conservancy projects,and finds out the factors that affect the evolution path of the interaction between government and enterprise through the analysis of the changes of government supervision and enterprise operating costs.The game model of government and enterprise in different situations is established,and the numerical simulation is carried out.The results show that the cost and benefit of the government and private enterprises to adopt the strategy,and the punishment of the government to the private enterprises'negative performance behavior are the important factors affecting their strategy choice.In the supervision of water conservancy projects,the government should focus on the change of operating costs and the intensity of punishment.The government should ensure the stability and effectiveness of the interaction between government and enterprise by setting reasonable punitive measures and improving the supervision mechanism.
water conservancy project supervisiongovernment regulationbusiness operating costsevolutionary gamestability analysis
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
维普
