摘要
近年来,平台杀手收购在世界范围内盛行.它是指具有市场优势地位的平台企业专门针对初创企业发起的收购,以数据垄断为手段,以消灭初创企业、巩固自身垄断地位为目的.平台杀手收购阻碍竞争、创新、公平,影响初创企业利益、消费者利益乃至社会整体利益,而我国现有监管体系难以有效规制此类问题,表现为包容审慎监管理念异化、单一营业额申报标准失灵、事后长监管缺位与威慑不足.为此,执法机构宜在坚持平台杀手收购事前监管与事后监管相结合、属事管辖与属人管辖相结合、内部监管与外部监管相结合等原则基础上,遵循具有排除、限制竞争效果须审查,清单平台的收购交易须全数审查,依法行使回溯调查与收购撤销权等规则要求.
Abstract
In recent years,platform killer acquisitions have become prevalent worldwide.It refers to acquisitions initiat-ed by platform enterprises with a dominant market position specifically targeting start-ups,using data monopoly as a means to eliminate start-ups and consolidate their own monopoly position.Platform killer acquisitions impede competition,innova-tion and fairness,and affect interests of start-ups,consumers and even society as a whole.However,China's existing regula-tory system is difficult to effectively regulate such issues,manifesting itself in the alienation of the idea of a prudent yet ac-commodative approach to regulation,the failure of a single turnover reporting standard,and the absence of ex post long term regulation and insufficient deterrence.In this regard,law enforcement agencies should,on the basis of the principles of com-bining ex ante and ex post supervision,combining subject matter and personal jurisdiction,and combining internal and ex-ternal supervision of platform killer acquisitions,follow the requirements of rules such as reviewing the effect of exclusion and restriction of competition,reviewing all the acquisition transactions of the listed platforms,and exercising the right of retrospective review and revocation of acquisitions in accordance with the law.
NETL
NSTL
万方数据