Operating Mechanism Analysis of Carbon Market Verification System Based on the Perspective of Four-Party Evolutionary Game
To ensure the authenticity and reliability of data in the carbon trading market,the Chinese government has introduced a system of MRV(Monitoring,Reporting,Verifica-tion).Its core is to introduce an independent third-party institution to verify the carbon emission report of emission control enterprises.In the process ofoperation,the problem of collusion between the enterprises and the third-party institutions often occurs.This pa-per constructs a four-party evolutionary game model from the perspective of the mutual influence of local governments,emission enterprises,third-party verification institutions and the public in the carbon trading market.The results show that the reduction of govern-ment supervision cost can promote the whole system to achieve the ideal situation;The government and the public are mutually reinforcing;When the government subsidizes public participation,the subsidy amount should be controlled within a certain range;Third-party institutions are more difficult to supervise than control enterprises;The cost of verification is a key factor hindering the normal operation of third-party organizations.The effect of government punishment is better than government reward.
MRV systemcarbon tradingthird-party verification institutionspublic par-ticipationfour-party evolutionary game
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