基于四方演化博弈视角的碳市场核查体系运行机制分析
Operating Mechanism Analysis of Carbon Market Verification System Based on the Perspective of Four-Party Evolutionary Game
董雨 1刘佳旭1
作者信息
- 1. 中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽 合肥 230026
- 折叠
摘要
为保证碳交易市场中数据的真实可靠我国政府引入一套MRV(监测Mon-itoring、报告Reporting、核查Verification)体系.其核心是引入独立的第三方机构对控排企业的碳排放报告进行核查.在运行过程中,控排企业与第三方机构合谋的问题经常发生.从地方政府、控排企业、第三方核查机构、公众在碳交易市场中相互影响的角度,构建四方演化博弈模型,研究发现:政府监管成本的降低可以促进整个系统实现理想情形;政府监督和公众参与是相互促进的关系;在公众参与监督时,政府对公众的补贴额度要控制在一定范围内;第三方机构比控排企业更加难以监管;核查成本是阻碍第三方机构正常运行的关键因素.政府惩罚效果优于政府奖励.
Abstract
To ensure the authenticity and reliability of data in the carbon trading market,the Chinese government has introduced a system of MRV(Monitoring,Reporting,Verifica-tion).Its core is to introduce an independent third-party institution to verify the carbon emission report of emission control enterprises.In the process ofoperation,the problem of collusion between the enterprises and the third-party institutions often occurs.This pa-per constructs a four-party evolutionary game model from the perspective of the mutual influence of local governments,emission enterprises,third-party verification institutions and the public in the carbon trading market.The results show that the reduction of govern-ment supervision cost can promote the whole system to achieve the ideal situation;The government and the public are mutually reinforcing;When the government subsidizes public participation,the subsidy amount should be controlled within a certain range;Third-party institutions are more difficult to supervise than control enterprises;The cost of verification is a key factor hindering the normal operation of third-party organizations.The effect of government punishment is better than government reward.
关键词
MRV体系/碳交易/第三方核查机构/公众参与/四方演化博弈Key words
MRV system/carbon trading/third-party verification institutions/public par-ticipation/four-party evolutionary game引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据