Credit Guarantee Financing in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain with Random Yield and Random Demand
To solve financing difficulties of capital-constrained manufacturers,this study considers a supply chain finance system in which the downstream enterprise,the retailer,provides a credit guarantee for the manufacturer's bank financing.The customer demand and the yield of the manufacturer are both assumed to be random.We formulate a sequential non-cooperative game model where the lending bank acts as a leader,the retailer acts as a subleader,and the manufacturer acts as the follower.The analytical model shows that when the retailer's credit guarantee proportion increases,the bank's optimal interest rate decreases,the capital-constrained manufacturer's optimal production quantity increases,and the optimal procurement price determined by the retailer decreases.We further conclude that there exists a credit guarantee threshold for the manufacturer to choose bank financing to achieve the production quantity in the channel without capital constraint.Finally,we perform a numerical analysis for illustrative and comparative purposes,and verify that the retailer's credit guarantee is beneficial for improving channel performance.
capital constraintrandom yieldrandom demandcredit guaranteebank financing
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