Research on Game Model Construction of Shadow Banking and Financial Supervision in China
Under the background of separate supervision of China's financial industry,the regulatory issues of shadow banking of crossinstitutional"large asset management"has attracted much attention.The emergence and evolution of shadow banking also reflect the internal logic of China's financial system and regulatory system.This paper takes the internal game of shadow banking and financial supervision as the starting point,and uses the dynamic evolution game model to explore the process and influencing factors of the game between shadow banking and financial supervision.The conclusions of the study show that the unequal of excess return and punishment,the insufficient ability of non-bank financial institutions'original business,and the low degree of supervision cooperation make shadow banks choose to innovate continuously;Both reducing the cost of supervision cooperation and weakening the possibility of supervision free riding are helpful to improve financial supervision cooperation.On the basis of the research conclusion,the paper puts forward some suggestions,such as unblocking the interest rate transmission channel,optimizing the structure of financial system,clarifying the rights and responsibilities of financial supervision,and increasing the punishment for violations.
shadow bankingfinancial supervisionevolutionary game
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
