Research on the Credit Behavior of Agricultural Products with the Participation of Agricultural Companies
The existence of supply chain finance can effectively alleviate the problem of financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises.Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper discusses the credit behavior strategy of agricultural supply chain finance under the participation of agricultural guarantee companies.It is found that in agricultural supply chainfinance,the influence of government participation and government subsidy on the strategy choice of agricultural guarantee companies is slight,and the strategy choice of agricultural guarantee companies is"no guarantee".With the increase of government subsidies,the strategy choices of agribusinesses and e-commerce financial institutions are found to change to a certain extent.Regulatory costs,taxes,and subsidies and penalties will affect the evolution of the government's strategy;government subsidies,income from sales of agricultural products,taxes paid on agricultural products,losses from bond defaults,and government penalties will affect the evolution of agribusinesses'strategies;guarantee fees provided by supply chain firms,proceeds from collaterals in the event of defaults by agribusi-nesses,as well as government subsidies and penalties will affect agribusinesses'strategies;and interest on bonds,government subsidies,and government penalties will affect e-commerce financial institutions'strategies.Subsidies and government penalties affect the evolution strategy of e-commerce financial institutions.Finally,the numerical simulation results are used to provide reference suggestions for the parties involved in agricultural supply chain finance and credit.
supply chain financeagricultural creditagricultural credit companiesevolu-tionary game
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