Analysis of the Evolution Game of Environmental Pollution Third Party Governance Considering the Overall Rating of Environmental Protection Credit
In order to improve the multi party environmental behavior in the third party governance of environmental pollution,especially for the problem that it is difficult to define the environmental pollution responsibility in the third party governance,an evo-lutionary game model with the participation of pollutant discharge enterprises,pollution control enterprises and local governments is built,and the impact of implementing environmental credit rating on the third-party governance of environmental pollution is em-phatically studied.The research shows that the environmental credit rating of pollutant discharge enterprises is an effective measure to realize the coordinated optimization of the strategy selection of pollutant discharge enterprises and local governments;The govern-ment subsidy can not realize the coordinated optimization of the strategy selection of pollution control enterprises and local govern-ments,while the environmental credit rating can be achieved;Compared with pollution discharge enterprises,pollution control enter-prises are more sensitive to environmental credit rating.However,the implementation of environmental credit rating for pollution discharge enterprises or pollution control enterprises can not achieve the collaborative optimization of the three strategies,and then put forward the overall rating mechanism of environmental credit,and verified the effectiveness of the mechanism;Further parame-ter analysis shows that the key to realize the collaborative optimization of the three strategies is to improve the environmental credit rating income of pollution control enterprises;The increase of mutual compensation coefficient is helpful to the optimization of the strategy choice of pollutant discharge enterprises and pollution control enterprises,but if the value is too high,the probability of lo-cal governments choosing the"active supervision"strategy will be reduced.It is suggested that the government should actively im-plement the environmental credit rating of pollution discharge enterprises and pollution control enterprises,and optimize the supervi-sion mode by strengthening the mechanism design of mutual supervision between pollution discharge enterprises and pollution con-trol enterprises.
environmental pollutionthird party governanceenvironmental credit ratinggovernment subsidiesevolutionary game
万方数据
维普
