An Analysis of Game Between"Holdout"and Local Government in Suburban Residential Land Expropriation:On the Policy of"Equal Treatment"and"Demolition Rewards"
In the suburban residential land expropriation,the behavior and strategy choice of"holdout"and local government will directly affect the distribution of land value-added income,the amount of land expropriation,land expropriation cost and social welfare level.By constructing the game model,we can draw the following conclu-sions.The reasons why"holdout"can obtain more compensation are that they invest more resistance resources,tol-erate or effectively avoid the losses caused by local government punishment,and thus have the advantage of resist-ance cost.The policies of"equal treatment"and"demolition reward"implemented by the local government are a two-stage"ultimatum"strategy,which can distinguish"holdout"from ordinary farmers,but it also makes the con-flicts between"holdout"and the local government inevitable.In the bargaining process between"holdout"and lo-cal government,compared with ordinary farmers,"holdouts"have higher risk tolerance and bargaining power,and can obtain more benefits,but they are still lower than the share obtained by local government.The local govern-ment can screen the two types of farmers by means of gradual exploration.Therefore,there is no situation that the"holdout"struggle brings external positive effects to ordinary farmers.The game between"holdout"and local gov-ernment is to compete for land value-added income.The game is not a positive sum game or a zero sum game,but rather a negative sum game.
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