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平台转移成本与"二选一"协议——基于Hotelling模型的市场垄断行为分析

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"二选一"协议是大型平台惯用的维持用户的手段,但协议并不属于"本身违法"行为,如何认定与治理"二选一"垄断是平台反垄断的重难点之一.转移成本是平台内消费者与经营者在选择合作平台时的重要参考因素之一.通过构建平台市场模型,计算不同市场结构下的"二选一"协议对社会福利水平的影响,发现只有平台内用户在退出平台时存在转移成本时,平台企业的"二选一"协议才构成垄断行为.同时,占据份额优势的平台会主动让渡一部分市场份额,以阻止其他小型平台的过度竞争,且让渡份额的大小与转移成本的大小正比例相关.在数字平台市场中,转移成本多以数据要素的形式存在,通过数据可携带权可以实现对"二选一"协议垄断的有效治理.
Transfer Costson Platform and the"One of Two"Agreement——Analysis of Monopoly Based on Hotelling Model
As a common practice to retain users for platforms,the"Choose One out of Two"agreement is not per se ille-gal.How to identify and manage exclusive dealing monopoly is the key and difficult point of platform anti-monopoly.The switching cost is an important factors for consumers and operators to choose the cooperation platform.Constructing a plat-form model to calculate the impact of the"Choose One out of Two"agreement on the social welfare.It is found that the"Choose One out of Two"agreement constitute monopoly act only when the platform users have switching costs.At the same time,platforms that occupy a share advantage will actively give a portion of the market share to prevent excessive competition from other small platforms,and the size of the given share is positively proportional to the size of the transfer cost.In the digital platform market,the switching cost mostly exists in the form of data,and the data portability right is an effective measures to eliminate the switching cost.

platform monopolyswitching costschoose one out of two

张蕴萍、路文成

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中共山东省委党校 (山东行政学院) 校刊编辑部, 济南 250014

恒丰银行 博士后科研工作站, 济南 250000

数字平台 数据要素 平台反垄断 转移成本 "二选一"协议

国家社会科学基金山东省"泰山学者"建设工程专项

22BJL115

2024

商业研究
哈尔滨商业大学 中国商业经济学会

商业研究

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:1.012
ISSN:1001-148X
年,卷(期):2024.(1)
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