从本身违法到合理原则——数字平台自我优待的反垄断分析
王业亮1
作者信息
摘要
自我优待是数字时代搭售、拒绝交易与差别待遇等行为的统称.受益于跨界整合,数字平台具有双重身份优势.自我优待可能是数字平台提高竞争对手成本、提取垄断租金与排除潜在市场进入者的垄断行为,也可能是创新行业"为市场而竞争"模式的正常产物.数字平台自我优待既可能产生排除、限制竞争的不利后果,也可能因平台间竞争而具有经济效率方面的合理性.欧盟《数字市场法》对数字平台自我优待采取本身违法的事前规制方式,可能存在一刀切的过度规制.基于合理原则进行个案式的反垄断分析,更能合理应对数字平台的自我优待问题.
Abstract
Self-preferencing is a collective term for traditional monopolistic behaviors such as bundling,refusal to deal,and differential treatment in the digital age.Benefiting from cross-bor-der integration,digital platforms enjoy a dual-identity advantage.Self-preferencing may belong to a monopolistic behavior of digital platforms which raises the costs of competitors,extracts monopo-listic rents,and excludes potential market entrants;or it may be a normal product of the"compe-tition for the market"model in innovative industries.Self-preferencing by digital platforms may re-sult in adverse consequences such as exclusion and restriction of competition,but can also bring about rationality in terms of economic efficiency due to competition between platforms.The EU's Digital Market Law employs an ex ante regulatory approach that considers self-preferencing of dig-ital platforms as illegal per se,potentially leading to an one-fits-all type of over-regulation.A case-by-case antitrust analysis grounded in the principle of reasonableness offers a more reasona-ble approach to address the issue of platform self-preferencing.
关键词
自我优待/数字平台/本身违法/合理原则/反垄断规制引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据