Game theory attack pricing for mining pools in blockchain-based IoT

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外文标题：Game theory attack pricing for mining pools in blockchain-based IoT

外文摘要：The malicious mining pool can sacrifice part of its revenue to employ the computing power of blockchain network.The employed computing power carries out the pool mining attacks on the attacked mining pool.To realize the win-win game between the malicious mining pool and the employee,the paper proposes an Employment Attack Pricing Algorithm(EAPA)of mining pools in blockchain based on game theory.In the EAPA,the paper uses mathematical formulas to express the revenue of malicious mining pools under the employment attack,the revenue increment of malicious mining pools,and the revenue of the employee.It establishes a game model between the malicious mining pool and the employee under the employment attack.Then,the paper proposes an optimal computing power price selection strategy of employment attack based on model derivation.In the strategy,the malicious mining pool analyzes the conditions for the employment attack,and uses the de-rivative method to find the optimal utilization value of computing power,employees analyze the conditions for accepting employment,and use the derivative method to find the optimal reward value of computing power.Finally,the strategy finds the optimal employment computing power price to realize Nash equilibrium between the malicious mining pool and the employee under the current computing power allocation.The simulation re-sults show that the EAPA could find the employment computing power price that realizes the win-win game between the malicious mining pool and the employee.The EAPA also maximizes the unit computing power revenue of employment and the unit computing power revenue of honest mining in malicious mining pool at the same time.The EAPA outperforms the state-of-the-art methods such as SPSUCP,DPSACP,and FPSUCP.

外文关键词：

Game theoryBlockchainPoWMining poolEmployment attack

作者：

Yourong Chen、Hao Chen、Zhenyu Xiong、Banteng Liu、Zhangquan Wang、Meng Han

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作者单位：

College of Information Science and Technology,Zhejiang Shuren University,Hangzhou,310015,China

College of Electronics and Information,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou,310018,China

Viterbi School of Engineering,University of Southern California,Los Angeles,90089,USA

Binjiang Institute of Zhejiang University,Hangzhou,310053,China

Zhejiang Juntong Intelligence Co.Ltd,Hangzhou,310053,China

Zhejiang University,Hangzhou,310027,China

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关键词：

Game theory Blockchain PoW Mining pool Employment attack

出版年：

2024

DOI：

10.1016/j.dcan.2022.11.014

数字通信与网络(英文)

ISSN：

年,卷(期)：2024.10(4)