首页|公众参与下的PPP项目道德风险防范研究——基于双重委托代理视角

公众参与下的PPP项目道德风险防范研究——基于双重委托代理视角

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基于双重委托代理理论探析PPP项目中政府和企业的道德风险问题,研究公众作为双重委托代理中的最终委托方,其参与对防范公私合作道德风险生成的作用.运用演化博弈的方法,构建政企双方博弈和公众参与下的三方博弈模型,比较两个模型演化结果发现:①对企业来说,企业不采取道德风险行为的概率与政府严格监管、公众参与监督的概率正相关;②对政府来说,公众参与使得政府严格监管的概率和企业采取道德风险的概率由正相关转为负相关;③对公众来说,公众参与主要受到参与成本、政府举报奖励的影响.由此提出相关建议促进公众参与,防范政企道德风险.
Research on Moral Hazard Prevention of PPP Projects with Public Participation——Based on the Perspective of Dual Principal-agent
Based on the dual principal-agent theory,this paper analyzes the moral hazard of government and enterprises in PPP projects,and studies the role of the public,as the ultimate principal in dual principal-agent,in preventing the generation of moral hazard in public-private cooperation.Using the method of evolutionary game,this paper constructs a tripartite game model under the government enterprise game and public participation.Comparing the evolution results of the two models,it is found that:1)For enterprises,the probability of enterprises not taking moral hazard behavior is positively related to the probability of government strict supervision and public participation in supervision;2)For the government,public participation makes the probability of government strict supervision and the probability of enterprises taking moral hazard change from positive correlation to negative correlation;3)For the public,public participation is mainly affected by the cost of participation and government reporting incentives.Therefore,relevant suggestions are put forward to promote public participation and prevent moral risks of the government and enterprises.

PPP projectmoral hazardpublic participationdual principal-agent

任志涛、卿雪玲、姜兆胜

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天津城建大学 经济与管理学院,天津 300384

PPP项目 道德风险 公众参与 双重委托代理

天津市教委社会科学研究重大项目

2019JWZD36

2024

天津城建大学学报
天津城市建设学院

天津城建大学学报

影响因子:0.385
ISSN:2095-719X
年,卷(期):2024.30(2)
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