Independent Regulatory,Incentive Coordination:Research on Management of Grain CSR Reserve
In the current food supply system in China,state-owned grain enterprises only occupy a dominant position in the field of purchasing and storage,while socially responsible reserve storage enterprises are all over the grain production,acquisition,processing,retail and other links.The social responsibility reserve policy subsidizes enterprise reserves,which enables grain enterprises to leverage larger reserves at lower cost and bring greater market control ability to storage enterprises.According to property right theory and economic man theory,enterprises have the motivation to maximize their own interests by using various market opportunities,resulting in improper behaviors such as market speculation and reverse operation.Therefore,doing a good job in the management of social responsibility reserve of grain enterprises is the key to giving play to the efficiency of grain corporate social responsibility reserves.This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game between the government,the storage enterprise,and the public.The evolution process of firm behavior and strategy selection under different regulatory models are studied,and introduces the dynamic variables of the scale of enterprises according to the development characteristics of the"leading pilot-scale implementation"of social responsibility reserves,and obtains the hierarchical management method of grain corporate social responsibility reserves.The research results show that:For large-scale storage enterprises,the government can implement independent supervision,and encouraging the public to participate in the supervision of social responsibility reserves will improve the management effect.For small and medium-sized storage enterprises,the government needs to encourage the public to participate in the management of social responsibility reserves in order to achieve the desired regulatory effect;In extreme emergency situations,the government has insufficient regulatory power for small and micro storage entities,and it is necessary to impose high fines on the speculative behavior of storage enterprises and mobilize the public to participate in collaborative governance in order to achieve the desired management effect.Finally,relevant policy suggestions are put forward from five aspects.Accelerate the establishment of a long-term mechanism for hierarchical management of social responsibility reserve storage enterprises.Encourage the public to participate in the practice of social responsibility reserve management through multiple channels.Appropriately expand the proportion of social responsibility reserves of large-scale storage enterprises.Strengthen the emergency support connection between large storage enterprises and small and medium storage enterprises.Strengthen the social responsibility brand building and information release mechanism of storage enterprises.The innovations of this paper are as follows:In the past,most researches on corporate misconduct were conducted under the assumption of corporate homogeneity,focusing on static games.Based on system dynamics simulation,this paper introduces the dynamic mechanism of enterprise scale variables and analyzes the governance paths of social responsibility reserves of different scale storage enterprises.The simulation conclusion of extreme emergency situation also has certain applicability to emergency material management,and has certain practical significance.At present,China is in the pilot construction and exploration stage of social responsibility reserve mechanism,and the research has certain timeliness.
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维普
