股权质押、内部控制与权益资本成本
Equity Pledge,Internal Control and Cost of Equity Capital
钱红光 1胡新涛1
作者信息
- 1. 湖北工业大学 经济与管理学院,湖北 武汉 430068
- 折叠
摘要
本文以我国2014-2020年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了控股股东股权质押、内部控制对企业权益资本成本的影响结果.研究发现:控股股东进行股权质押会提高企业权益资本成本;企业内部控制质量越高,其权益资本成本越低;文中通过引入股权质押与内部控制的交互项,进一步研究了内部控制对股权质押与权益资本成本之间关系的调节作用,通过实证检验,发现内部控制会缓解股权质押对权益资本成本的正向影响,即内部控制对股权质押与资本成本之间的关系具有负向调节效应.研究结果丰富了股权质押相关领域的研究,为广大投资者、金融机构提供了部分参考.
Abstract
Taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2020 as research samples,this paper empiri-cally tests the impact of equity pledge and internal control of controlling shareholders on the cost of eq-uity capital.The results show that the equity pledge by the controlling shareholder will increase the cost of equity capital;The higher the quality of internal control,the lower the cost of equity capital;With the introduction of equity pledge with the interaction of the internal control,further study on the internal control of equity pledge with the regulation of relationships between equity capital cost,through empirical test,found that the internal control can ease the equity pledge of equity capital cost of positive influ-ence,namely the internal control of equity pledge and the relationship between the cost of capital has a negative effect adjustment.The results enrich the research in the field of equity pledge and provide some reference for investors and financial institutions.
关键词
股权质押/内部控制/权益资本成本Key words
Equity Pledge/Internal Control/Cost Of Equity Capital引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据