考虑交叉网络外部性和服务质量差异的网约车市场竞争策略研究
Research on Competitive Decision-Making of Ride-Hailing Market Considering Cross-Network Externality and Service Quality Difference
李豪 1曹长慧2
作者信息
- 1. 西部交通与经济社会发展研究中心,重庆 400074;重庆交通大学 经济与管理学院,重庆 400074
- 2. 重庆交通大学 经济与管理学院,重庆 400074
- 折叠
摘要
针对网约车平台之间的市场竞争问题,本文应用双边市场理论构建了双寡头博弈模型,探讨了司机端被部分覆盖和完全覆盖下的提供高低质量服务的网约车平台最优决策,分析了交叉网络外部性对网约车市场供需、双边用户最优定价及平台收益的影响.研究发现:当司机端的网络外部性较小时,两平台的最优决策为部分覆盖市场上的司机以实现供需平衡,反之应全部吸纳司机进入;高质量平台收益高于低质量平台,且不论被部分覆盖还是完全覆盖,司机端的网络外部性都对高质量平台有利.
Abstract
Aiming at the market competition between ride-hailing platforms,a duopoly game model is con-structed using the two-sided market theory,which discusses the optimal decision-making of ride-hailing platforms that provide high-and low-quality services under partial coverage and complete coverage of the driver,and analyzes the impact of cross-network externalities on supply and demand in the ride-hailing mar-ket,the optimal pricing of bilateral users and platforms revenue.The results show that when the network ex-ternality of the driver side is small,the optimal decision of the two platforms is to partially cover the driver in the market to achieve a balance between supply and demand,and vice versa.Platform that provide high-quality service has higher benefits than low-quality service platform,and whether partially or fully covered,the network externality of the driver side is beneficial to ride-hailing platform that provides high-quality service.
关键词
交叉网络外部性/服务质量差异/完全覆盖/部分覆盖Key words
Cross-Network Externality/Difference in Quality of Service/Full Coverage/Partial Coverage引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据