Antitrust Regulations on Self-Preferencing of Digital Platforms
Under the catalytic effect of the transformation of the"Internet ecosystem"development model,self-preferencing by digital platforms has emerged,and this behavior is the product of the profound transfor-mation of the relationship among platform entities.Based on the different characteristics of platforms in the implementation of preferencing strategies,self-preferencing can be subdivided into two core categories:rule-based and resource-based.Self-preferencing has significant positive effects in promoting platform efficiency and facilitating innovation.However,it also harbors hidden dangers of disrupting the market competition or-der.For this reason,regulating illegal self-preferencing behaviors is an important mission of the antitrust law.Unfortunately,the antitrust law encounters multiple difficulties in dealing with such behaviors,including the ambiguous definition of legal attributes,controversial analysis of illegality,and insufficient effectiveness of existing regulatory means.Therefore,there is an urgent need to clearly define the legal attributes of self-preferencing in accordance with the latest developments in international legal trends and the actual situation of the local economy and society,adhere to a scientific theory of illegality determination,and enhance the ef-fectiveness of antitrust regulatory means.Specifically,platform self-preferencing may constitute an abuse of market dominance,and the rule of reason should be adopted to evaluate its illegality.On this basis,antitrust enforcement agencies need to adopt a comprehensive governance strategy and build a full-fledged gover-nance system that integrates pre-event supervision and post-event regulation,with the expectation of creating a fairer and more orderly digital market competition environment.
digital platformsself-preferencingdual monopolyillegality analysispre-event supervision
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