首页|面向连接关键词可搜索加密的查询恢复攻击

面向连接关键词可搜索加密的查询恢复攻击

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  • 国家科技期刊平台
  • NETL
  • NSTL
  • 万方数据
为了恢复连接关键词可搜索加密方案中的用户查询,提出了2种针对连接查询可搜索加密方案的攻击方法,分别是交叉泄露攻击和频率匹配攻击.首先,从泄露中提取候选关键词集合;然后,分别利用关键词对结果模式泄露和查询频率信息进行过滤.结果表明,在交叉泄露攻击中,当攻击者仅掌握10%的数据集时,若关键词在空间为100,查询恢复的准确率可高达90%,将关键词空间扩大至1 000,攻击者依然能够恢复50%以上的查询;在频率匹配攻击中,即使攻击者仅已知不准确的频率分布信息,也至少可以准确恢复70%的查询.
Query recovery attacks against conjunctive keyword searchable encryption
In order to recover user's queries in conjunctive keyword searchable encryption schemes,two attacks against the conjunctive keyword searchable encryption schemes were proposed,such as cross leakage attack and frequency matching attack.Firstly,a set of candidate keywords were extracted from the leakage.Then the keywords were filtered according to the keyword pair result pattern leakage and query frequency information respectively.Results show that in the cross leakage attack,with knowledge of only 10%of the dataset,the accuracy of query recovery can reach up to 90%if the keyword space is 100.And more than 50%of the queries are still able to recovered by the attacker if the keyword space is expanded to 1 000.In frequency matching attack,even with only inaccurate frequency distribution information known to the attacker,at least 70%of queries can be accurately recovered.

cloud storagesearchable encryptionconjunctive keyword searchquery recovery attack

杜瑞颖、沈蓓、何琨、赵陈斌、王贝宁、陈晶

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武汉大学国家网络安全学院,湖北 武汉 430040

云存储 可搜索加密 连接关键词查询 查询恢复攻击

国家重点研发计划中央高校基本科研业务费专项国家自然科学基金湖北省重点研发计划湖北省重点研发计划山东省重点研发计划

2021YFB27002002042022kf1195621723032021BAA1902022BAA0392022CXPT055

2024

10.11959/j.issn.1000-436x.2024141

通信学报
中国通信学会

通信学报

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子：1.265
ISSN：1000-436X
年,卷(期)：2024.45(8)