Collusion-resistant cross-chain transaction scheme based on game theory and verifiable consensus
Existing cross-chain transaction solutions often overlook the issue of cross-chain collusion.In response,the counter-collusion cross-channel was proposed to facilitate scalable and collusion-resistant cross-chain transactions.Firstly,a strategy for establishing multiple-relay channels was introduced,including relay chain observers.These chan-nels serve as off-chain pathways connecting users from different business chains,thereby facilitating private and scalable cross-chain transactions.Secondly,a collusion-resistant cross-chain transaction protocol based on game-theoretic incen-tives was designed,stimulating distrust among colluders to deter cross-chain collusion and uphold transaction security.Thirdly,a layered verifiable cross-chain consensus method was proposed,relying on channel state proofs to ensure se-cure cross-chain settlement.Formal analyses of participant game dynamics demonstrate that non-collusion emerges as the dominant strategy for channel users under reasonable assumptions.Experimental results indicate that the proposed scheme effectively prevents cross-chain collusion while achieving high cross-chain throughput and scalability compared to traditional relay-based cross-chain solutions.
万方数据
维普
